The requirement for U.S. repair stations to establish, implement, and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS) under the U.S./European Union Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA) became official in February. The Bilateral Oversight Board’s decision No. 13 amended Annex II of the BASA and brought to regulatory reality the warning of FAA’s June 2024 InFo 24007.
The American aviation safety rules (in part 5) for domestic repair stations do not require an SMS, but those holding or applying for EASA approval under the bilateral must establish one. The requirement is effective right now for applicants; existing approval holders must show compliance by Jan. 1, 2026.
The exact language added to Appendix 1 of Annex 2 provides the following requirement:
“The repair station shall establish, implement, and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS) acceptable to the FAA and compliant with ICAO Annex 19 as applicable to maintenance organizations. The FAA SMS Voluntary Program outlines the process and requirements.” (See, Annex II, Appendix I, Paragraph 1.1.1.(b).)
The FAA SMS voluntary program has had a less than stellar beginning; it is hard to navigate, few inspectors understand the “scalable” requirements, and even fewer can apply ICAO standards — particularly since ICAO “requirements” are directed at the countries (states), not the applicants or certificate holders. It has taken years for the countries to adopt, implement, and manage their own SMS, and that confusion will be brought to American repair station applicants and certificate holders. To sell maintenance services worldwide, a repair station must take on the cost of compliance, but whether an SMS reduces risk in the aerospace environment has yet to be supported by objective data.
Despite the dubious value of the requirement, ARSA urges both government and industry to make good on the promise of “safety management.” That means both sides must recognize the safety continuum is contained in the regulations: American standards for safety management of aerospace maintenance start with part 43, add the repair station’s quality system mandates in § 145.211, and the personnel requirements in subpart D. These provide the foundation for managing technical and human risk. A certificate holder’s business must be focused on maintaining compliance.
How can the regulator demand and oversee SMS if it punishes certificate holders for revealing non-compliance? Government tendency towards hunting “violations” deters the very communication on which “safety management” depends. Forcing corrective action based on guidance or preference rather than rule-based safety analysis produces nothing but defensiveness and mistrust. Mistrust is not removed by silence; it can only be addressed through open, honest, boundary-pushing communications that do not punish indiscriminately.
Regardless of its regulator, a repair station/approved maintenance organization would do well to layer SMS within existing quality management systems. At its core, safety management is a human factors discipline, training in which is already required for American facilities holding EASA approval under the bilateral. Those approval holders integrate “lessons learned” from within the quality system into “lessons received” by personnel to prevent future escapes — a considerable step towards SMS implementation. Closing the gap between how things work in a repair station’s systems and applying it to what the company does to control organizational risk is the key to a successful program.
Last year, ARSA’s member newsletter explored the PEAR Human Factors Model (People, Environment, Actions, Resources) in safety risk management for aerospace maintenance. In a maintenance facility, each element in the model helps focus the organization on airworthiness. Tending to these characteristics ultimately ensures the company can “do … work in such a manner and use materials of such a quality, that the condition of the aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance worked on will be at least equal to its original or properly altered condition.” The performance standard of § 43.13(b) establishes the foundation for human factors in aviation maintenance Safety Management Systems.
A true SMS will be integrated into existing requirements, not piled on top of other manuals and programs designed to elicit self-disclosure and corrective or remedial action, e.g., Aviation Safety Action Programs, hotline and whistleblower systems, and other avenues to communicate potentially non-compliant behaviors or actions. Certificate holders meet regulatory standards to demonstrate system safety. Their business strategies must protect private interests while eliciting information detrimental to safety or profit. To avoid creating more opportunities for miscommunication, mistakes, and mistrust, SMS cannot be added to existing systems; it must be integrated.
Sarah MacLeod is managing member of Obadal, Filler, MacLeod & Klein, P.L.C. and a founder and executive director of the Aeronautical Repair Station Association. She has advocated for individuals and companies on international aviation safety law, policy, and compliance issues since the 1980s.